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Summa Theologiae · I-II, q. 16, a. 2

Whether Use Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, First Part of the Second Part, question 16, Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means, article 2. About 2 min.

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Text: Summa Theologiae, Project Gutenberg #17897, First Part of the Second Part (Prima Secundae), translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. The First Part of the Second Part of the Summa in the English Dominican translation (first printed 1911 to 1925; second and revised edition from 1920). A sample check on 2026-11-09 against pre-1931 printings at the Internet Archive (first printings of 1915 and 1916 and the second and revised edition of the 1920s) found that the article text matches, with no 1947 introduction, synopsis, or index. The phrase “From the Complete American Edition” in Gutenberg's catalog title is a provenance note only. Question and article numbers were added by the transcriber. Rights: Public domain (US)

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Objection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found in irrational animals, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 2). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.

Obj. 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use.

On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational animal can make use of a thing."

I answer that, as stated above (A. 1), to use is to apply an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q. 15, AA. 1, 2, 3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a rational animal consents and uses.

Reply Obj. 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.

Reply Obj. 2: Animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.

Also online, linked only: the same translation at New Advent and the Latin text at Corpus Thomisticum. Neither is copied here.

Source: Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, First Part of the Second Part. Project Gutenberg #17897. Project Gutenberg record. Public domain in the USA. Outside the U.S., check local copyright rules. Project Gutenberg notices retained. The full Project Gutenberg license is kept in the hosted text.